

Quality Indicators in British General Practice: or, the pros and cons of performance related pay!


Professor Helen Lester
National Primary Care Research and Development
Centre
University of Manchester
UK



Content of the presentation

- **Variation in practice: the need for quality improvement in general practice**
- **What does research tell us about what makes a difference to quality of care**
- **UK government initiatives 1998-2003 – did they make a difference?**
- **Quality related pay 2003-2006 – intended and unintended consequences**





1980s

- Quality can't be measured
- There's no such thing as a bad doctor



Good practice allowance – first suggested in the UK in 1986

The conference said “No” to a Good Practice Allowance.

Dr Wilson said that the Good Practice Allowance was political and provocative. It was prepared by a government who only listened to philosophers and trendy professors.

**Report from the British Medical Association
BMJ 1986; 293: 1384-6**



1990s in the UK


A decade of quality improvement initiatives, mainly from Government

But what improves quality?


And did they work?



Achieving quality in practice in the 1990s




Quality of care in the UK improved between 1998 and 2003



Quality of care in 42 representative English practices.
Campbell et al. BMJ 2005; 331: 1121-1123.

Quality of care improved between 1998 and 2003 (patients with coronary heart disease)



Quality of care in 42 representative English practices.
Campbell et al. BMJ 2005; 331: 1121-1123.

1980s

- Quality can't be measured
- There's no such thing as a bad doctor

2000

- Care is too variable
- Quality can be measured
- Care can be improved- the advent of EBM
- Public perceptions and disquiet
- It's expensive to provide high quality care
- “We want to be resourced and rewarded for providing high quality care”
- Political will to invest in the NHS underpinned by sustained economic growth



2003 UK pay for performance scheme “Quality and Outcomes Framework”

25% of GPs’ income relates to a complex set of initially 146 quality indicators

- Chronic disease management (ten conditions)
- Practice organisation (five areas)
- Additional services (four areas)
- Patient experience (consultation length and patient surveys)



Target domains and points available

Domain	N of indicators	Points available	% of total
<i>(Evidence based indicators)</i>			
Clinical	76	550	52%
Organisational	56	184	17%
Patient Experience	4	100	10%
Additional Services	10	36	3%
<i>(Additional payment points)</i>			
Holistic care (clinical)		100	10%
Access bonus (24/48 hr access)		50	5%
Quality Practice (non-clinical)		30	3%
TOTAL	146	1050	100%



Details of the clinical domain

	N of indicators	Points Available	% of total
Ischaemic heart disease	15	121	22%
Hypertension	5	105	19%
Diabetes	18	99	18%
Asthma	7	72	13%
COPD	8	45	8%
Mental health	5	41	7%
Stroke	10	31	6%
Epilepsy	4	16	3%
Cancer	2	12	2%
Hypothyroidism	2	8	1%
Total	76	550	100%



CHD 7. The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease whose notes have a record of total cholesterol in the previous 15 months.


Point score: from 1 point (40%) to 7 points (90%)

CHD 8. The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease whose last total cholesterol (measured in the last 15 months) is 5 mmol/l or less


Point score: from 1 point (40%) to 17 points (70%)



Reported achievement, Year 1



Reported achievement, Year 2



Target domains and points 2006-8

Domain	N of indicators available	Points	% of total
<i>(Evidence based indicators)</i>			
Clinical	80	655	65%
Organisational	43	181	18%
Patient Experience	4	108	11%
Additional Services	8	36	4%
<i>(Additional payment points)</i>			
Holistic care (clinical)		20	2%
TOTAL		1000	100%



QOF changes in 2006

166 points change: 137 in clinical areas

	N of indicators	Points Available
Depression	2	33
Atrial Fibrillation	3	30
CKD	4	27
Dementia	2	20
Obesity	1	8
Palliative care	2	6
Learning Disability	1	4
Ethnicity recording	1	1



**QOF depression
screening tools
'next to useless'**

**CKD fad is a triumph of
fashion over sense**

**CKD targets drive mass
overuse of ACE drugs**

**Depression and
CKD targets hit
income**



**What are the effects of this type
of financial incentive likely to
be?**




What might the effects be?

- Improved care
- Increased computerization / admin. costs
- Fragmentation, less holistic approach
- Un-incentivized areas get worse care
- Gaming or misrepresentation
- Change in professional values



Quality of care improved further between 2003 and 2005, following the introduction of financial incentives



2005 data extends the time series in 42 representative practices reported by Campbell et al. BMJ 2005; 331: 1121-1123.

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Less holistic approach?

“The profession has essentially been bribed to implement a population based disease management program that often conflicts with the individual patient centered ethos of general practice...it comes dangerously close to medicine by numbers and threatens the basis of general practice.”

Lipman T. Br *J Gen Pract* 2005; 55: 396.



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Exception reporting for clinical indicators

- Patient refused
- Not clinically appropriate
- Newly diagnosed or recently registered
- Already on maximum doses of medication




Exception reporting rates

Overall median 5.55%

444 practices (4.5%) had overall exception rates higher than 10%

n=8105 practices in England





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“We developed this zero tolerance of blood pressure. No-one is allowed to say ‘It’s a little bit up, leave it’ it’s not acceptable.”

Senior GP

Roland M, Campbell S, Bailey N, Whalley D, Sibbald B. *Primary Health Care Research and Development* 2006; 7: 70-78



“They (the GPs) forget we’re actually nurses. You’ve not stopped all day because you have had ill patients. And then they come in and tell you that you are 1% down on a target.”

Practice Nurse



“I enjoy being given the autonomy to manage the different diseases.... because we are actually meeting targets, patient care has definitely improved.”

Practice Nurse




“It will not provide the care for the whole person. It doesn’t allow that I have sat in this chair for over twenty years and I know my patients really well. It doesn’t allow for that. You can’t count that...and you can’t count the caring element.”

Senior GP



Trends in Job Satisfaction



Lessons for others?

- § Incentives in the UK appear to have improved the quality of patient care; avoided inappropriate treatment through exception reporting and improved GP job satisfaction
- § Good quality baseline data are important
- § Indicators that go beyond national guidelines need careful piloting and educational support
- § IT infrastructure is essential
- § The financial costs have been substantial, reflecting reward and resource and may have been too much?



“An initiative to improve the quality of primary care that is then boldest such proposal on this scale ever attempted in the world...with one mighty leap, the NHS has vaulted over anything being attempted in the United States, the previous leader in quality improvement initiatives.”

Shekelle P. *BMJ* 2004;326:457-8.



Thanks for listening!



Could P4P increase health inequalities?

- Practices in deprived areas may be financially disadvantaged
 - Lower rates of achievement
 - Reduced financial reward for same level of achievement
- Patients in deprived areas may not benefit
 - More likely to be exception reported
 - Less likely to be registered



“The greatest challenge facing contemporary medicine is for it to retain or regain its humanity- its centre- without losing its essential foundation in science...to find a middle way.”

James Willis. The Paradox of Progress. 1994.



Patient and public involvement 2006

